











Political violence is a broad term that is often identified with acts of violence perpetuated by individuals or the state with the lone purpose of achieving political goals. Political violence may come in two modes, either as political terrorism or counter terrorism. The former is determined as the aggressive manipulation of an individual’s judgments by threats and intimidations to achieve political change. Such intimidations are often perpetuated by non-governmental agents who act on the basis of a certain political ideology. The latter presupposes the preventive measures the government is doing in fighting against all forms of terrorism, which in the process will inevitably lead to war. War, in this regard, is conceived to be the lone and most feasible alternative, taken by the state, in order to resolve arm conflicts and political violence.  With the intention that in so doing, the absolute welfare and well-being of the people is safeguarded and proliferated. It is for this reason that the paper intends to examine whether the well-being of the people is upheld if the state, inflicted with arm conflicts and terrorism, will engage with war against non-government agents. Moreover, the paper intends to examine, following Amartya Sen’s capability approach, how both of these forms of political violence affect the development of the individual. This paper, following Sen, adheres to the idea that any attempt of resolving violence by resorting to war is futile. War in all its form is destructive to the claim of individual development. The government that readily engages into war without having to consider first any democratic dialogues in solving arm conflicts is not fulfilling its task of protecting and prioritizing the development of the people. In war there is no individual development. 
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1. Introduction:
	On May 23, 2017 the entire country was terrorized when the news about Marawi city being under siege by ISIS inspired-group broke out. “Marawi, the capital of Mindanao’s Lanao del Sur province and whose mostly Muslim 200,000 population make the city the biggest Islamic community [1.Joseph Hincks, 2017]”, was instantly transformed into a war zone as the government troops fought to recapture the city from the “Maute terrorists who were then about 700 in number with the inclusion of some Abu Sayyaf members [2 Ryan Rosauro, 2017].” The ferocious fight –which lasted for six months and which reduced the city into a pile of rubble and dust– claimed almost 1000 lives and caused the diaspora of more than 200, 000 inhabitants [3 Associated Press, 2017]. The war was further intensified as the government forces opted to bomb the entire city in the hope of hastening the eradication of the terrorist group. The persistent bombing has not only cut short the lives of the enemies of the state but it likewise caused the total destruction of the entire city.  More than 50,000 families are made homeless because of the government’s attempt of hastening the liberation of the city from the Maute group [4.Allan Naval, 2017]. And on October 16, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte announced the liberation of the city from the Maute-ISIS group following the death of their leaders. The war is finally over and the city is again free. But despite of this joyous fact, there hides another terror that every inhabitant of the city must face. Such terror is no longer caused by any terrorist group, but is induced rather by the aftermath of the war. It is not hidden from us how devastating the war in Marawi was. It did not just destroy the enemies but it likewise destroyed the entire city and the hope of the people of Marawi.
 Terrorism is absolute evil. It deprives innocent civilians of the good life they envisioned to live.  A place ravage by terrorists, aside from being chaotic and underdeveloped, is devoid of any possibilities of actual human development. Individuals living in a politically hostile environment are rejected of their fundamental rights to self-development and freedom. Terrorists, in this regard, are aimed to absolutely deny the individuals of their freedom to choose the kind of life they find reasonable to live, for the reason that no such opportunity is given to them. They instill fear in the minds of the people through intimidation and violence, in order for them to raise their personal concerns and selfish-interests to the government. Terrorists direct their attention on harassing and killing civilians to achieve their goal of a radical political change. This vulgarity on the part of the terrorists often leads to war.  The government, in preventing the proliferation of acts of terrorism, engages into war against terrorists. Counter-terrorism is the expedient way of resolving the problem of terrorism. It is intended ultimately to eliminate all terrorists and protect the innocent civilians who may become possible targets of terrorist attacks. Moreover, with the use of advance technologies in the war against terrorists, counter-terrorist measures are made precise and effective in exterminating the enemies. But it is also from the use of these advance military technologies that the counter- terrorist measures are, more often than not, causing larger destructions and far more deaths than the terrorists themselves.
This paper is not intended to discuss and evaluate the moral valuing of both proponents of war. Rather, what this paper argues is that in either case the individual development is compromised. This is so because both instances of political violence are destructive to the project of development.  War, in all its forms, is in contradiction to human development. It denies the individual subject of the opportunity to be capacitated to project for the life he values living. In a place that is constantly ravaged by wars, the welfare of the civilians is always jeopardized. War ultimately denies the individual of his substantive freedom. It forces man to live in a dehumanizing state of existence of absolute fear and poverty. Development, as the extension of the individual capabilities or freedoms, is devalued in times of war. This is so because in a war afflicted area all opportunities for development are closed. Development as the expansion of individual liberty is devalued in a community whose state of peace and order is always threatened by the presence of war and terrorism. 

2. Terrorism and War
	The debate on the justifiability of either case of political violence must not ultimately be identified on the basis of our conventional understanding of terrorism and war. It is rather unpersuasive to argue that terrorism is unjustifiable for it deliberately targets innocent civilians in pursuing its goals of effecting radical political changes.  While war against terrorism is justified for it seeks to protect the people from being terrorized. Although it is true that all acts of terror are condemnable and that counter terrorism, which leads to war, is in some sense good for its intention is to protect the population from terrorism; but if we are to examine both proponents of war, they bring, at to some extent, similar destructive effects, that is, both are detrimental to the project of well-being and development. And furthermore, if one is to compare the deaths and the extent of the damage that these two instances of political violence caused to the populace, the person will realize that “the actions of states opposing terrorist groups have frequently killed far more civilians than have terrorists [5. Virginia Held, 2004, 61].” This is not to say that the former is justified while the later is in contrary not. What is being presupposed here is that our conventional understanding of the differences between both instances of political violence is limiting. In order to properly engage into the debate, one must begin with the necessity of comparing the number of deaths and the actual extent of the damage that is caused in either instance of violence. The comparison should not lead us to determine which is far more justifiable between them; rather it must push us to realize that violence is detrimental to the development of the people. Violence should not be perceived as the sole alternative to solving political conflicts and disputes.
	 The necessity of reexamining our notion of terrorism springs from the fact that it cannot be determined under a specific definition. Defining terrorism is a notoriously difficult task due to its multiplicity of forms. “There are different kinds of terrorism as there are of war [6.Ibid.].” To define terrorism as simply the deliberate killing of innocent civilians is insufficient to determine the nature of such phenomenon. The description tends to disqualify the moral equivalence of the atrocities that anti-terrorist acts proliferate in the process of obliterating terrorist groups. The conventional definition of terrorism as “the random killing of innocent people, in the hope of creating passive fear [7.Micheal Walzer, 2006, 3]” is necessarily limiting.  It tends simply to identify terrorism as an act that is proper to non government individuals whose interest simply is to terrorize the people, with the aim of causing political change. Micheal Walzer sees this as problematic, for even states are capable of causing terror. The bombings of Heroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that have caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians and terrorized the entire nation, surely, as Walzer argues, was an act of terrorism [8.Ibid.]. Although it is true that by nature terrorism posits a “continual threat to individuals’ sense of safety and well-being [9.J. Richman, 113]”, for it holds hostage the innocent civilians who are part of the government which they are opposing. And as Walzer asserts that: “It is the extension of violence or the threat of violence from individual to groups that is the special feature of terrorism [10.Micheal Walzer, 7].” But to simply limit such capacity of terrorizing innocent civilians to non-state individuals is unpersuasive. Surely, terrorism is political violence but so too the state’s counter terrorist measures is a form of political violence. The Marawi siege was one of the many instances of terrorism that the country had experienced over the past century of its being a republic. It was an act of deliberate devaluation of the people of Marawi with the lone intention of forcing the government to yield to the Mautes’ demands for political change. But so too was the bombing of some cities in Germany during the early 1940s by the allied forces. Although the intention maybe of only killing the German soldiers who were sympathetic to Hitler and the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians were perceived to be the collateral damage of war. Yet the fact of the matter remains, that there were civilians who were killed and were terrorized by the act.  War as acted by the state takes, in some sense, the same violence embraced by terrorists in pursuing their goals of political change. The differences merely lie on the execution of their intended goals. Terrorists tend to deliberately attack civilians while counter terrorist acts tend to not deliberately kill civilians. Micheal Walzer explicates: 

The terrorists hold that there is no such thing as ‘collateral’ or … secondary damage.  All damage for them is primary, and they want to do as much damage as they can: The more deaths, the more fear. So anti-terrorists have to distinguish themselves by insisting on the category of collateral damage, and by doing as little of it as they can [11.Ibid.]. 

	Counter- terrorism justifies its violence with the presupposition that the deaths and the extent of the damage it caused in the process of fighting against terrorists were non-deliberate, that is, they were not intentionally willed but are sheer collateral damages of war. The government, in this regard, is justified in waging war against terrorists even if it would entail the deaths of innocent civilians.  Walzer greatly disagrees with this position. For it is neither persuasive nor ethically sound to claim that the primary act of obliterating the enemies is willed while the secondary act of harming innocent civilians in the process is unintended. There should be, Walzer argues, two intentions. The first is the immediate annihilation of the terrorists and the second is the protection of innocent civilians during the war [12.Ibid.]. In view of this, the government must take absolute care to avoid harming the people and to make sure that only minimal damage is caused. But what transpires is often the contrary for more often than not, counter-terrorist acts are far more destructive and careless in pursuing its cause of annihilating the enemies.  
It is enough to reflect upon the destruction of Marawi city, after the government forces opted to bomb the entire city in wanting to eliminate the Maute group, to understand how anti-terrorist acts can compromise the safety and welfare of civilians in a war zone. Counter-terrorism is therefore a form of political violence. The killing and the terror it caused to civilians is likely to be the same as the killing and the terror that terrorists effect to their victims. A government that uses violence to suppress those non-government actors’ demands for political change by way of unjustified violence is guilty of the same terroristic tendency. “And sometimes they are more at fault because alternative course of action were more open to them [13.Virginia Held, 71].”  This is so because, “terrorism that kills civilians to oppose a government policies doe not distinguish between those who support and those who oppose the government. But neither does counter-terrorism that kills civilians distinguish between those who support and those who do not support terrorist groups [14.Ibid., 67].”
The paper does not intend to argue that terrorism is justifiable, for it cannot be justified, nor it claims that counter-terrorism is an absolute evil. What is simply being presupposed is in either case casualties are imminent. Innocent civilians are often the victims of war.  In war, the civilians are devalued and are striped off of their welfare and wellbeing. There is nothing good that can be deduced from violence.  Violence should be taken as the last resort if all possible options are taken but to no avail. The government must take the initiative to engage into a democratic dialogue, being the one who is in power to do so, with the “non-state actors”. This is so because “democracy is more effective than counter-terrorism [15.Ibid., 69].”

3. Capabilities and Human Development
	Amartya Sen, in wanting to reformulate the notion of development, proposed his capability approach theory as a philosophical and ethical framework where everyone can begin to discuss what truly development is about. Sen rejected the conventional notion of development that centers on welfare economics. Development, as expressed in wellbeing utility, is reduced to sheer satisfaction of preferences realized in the sheer acquisition and consumption of resources. Although Sen does not absolutely deny the instrumental value of commodities for the wellbeing of man, but what he is against with is its tendency to reduce man as a means for development, rather than an end in himself. In welfare economics development is ultimately identified with the sum total of the economic growth of a country as determined by its GNP and the GDP. In welfare economics therefore the main objective of development is economic growth and man being simply an instrument for its realization is reduced to a sheer means. The human being in this sense is dehumanized. The main objective therefore of the capability approach is to elevate man from his commodification in giving the person his lost dignity in the process of economic development. The capability approach takes its primary presuppositions from an Aristotelian and Marxist assertion of man being rational and economical. For Sen, man is by nature reasonable. Man is capacitated to freely choose the life the individual finds reasonable to live. Likewise, since the human person is an economic being his development must spring from him being freed from the commodification factors of welfare economics. The capability approach is intended simply to making development truly human. This is realized by Sen with his insistence on the necessity of freedom as the proper space for development. Putting freedom as the primary element for wellbeing directs us to the end that constitutes development rather than to some means. Sen expresses the point thus:

If freedom is what development advances, then there is a major argument for concentrating on that overarching objective, rather than on some particular means, or some specially chosen list of instruments. Viewing development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to some of the means that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process [16.Amartya Sen, 1999, 3].

 The insistence on the necessity of seeing development as the expansion of individual substantive freedom is coming from the very project of humanizing development.  The capability approach conceives freedom as the essential element for man to truly develop. Development in this regard is identified with the capability of man to freely choose the state of existence he finds reasonable to live and to do things he finds reasonable to do. It centers not on the things the person possesses and will posses, but on what the individual can be and do without being constraint and coerced by external factors foreign to his being rational and free. Severine Deneulin further explicates that: “By situating the evaluative space of quality of life in the capability space, that is, in what individuals are able to be or do, Sen’s capability approach implies that individuals are to be considered as the very subjects of development [17.Severine Deneulin, 2008, 106].” Development for Sen is not value neutral as simply being an instrument for human flourishment –the way welfare economics would portray development –but rather it is value laden, for it presupposes the primary development of the individual person’s freedom. Furthermore Sen argues:

Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states [18.Amartya Sen, 1999].

What Sen is conveying is that in order for a real development to happen, one’s substantive freedom must first be developed. This is so because the non-development of the individual’s substantive freedom would eventually lead to capability deficit or poverty. However, poverty is seen not simply as the lack of income nor of the absence of job; it is rather seen as a complex pathology that encloses all other aspects of human existence, such as personal heterogeneities, social, environmental and political aspects that may have contributed to the individual’s capability deficit. Poverty in this regard is caused absolutely by the lack of development of the individual’s substantive freedom. David Crocker simplifies the point of Sen in saying that: “Development ultimately aims at improving the kinds of lives human beings are living [19.David Crocker, 1992, 586].” Such is made possible by the expansion of the individual’s capabilities to do and to be in order to attain certain functionings or actual doings and beings which he finds valuable [20.Frances Stewart, 2013, 3].  Human development therefore is determined by the individual’s capacity to attain certain functionings which he finds reasonable to possess. That is, of whether the person is really free to choose for the kind of existence and the sort of actions to take in pursuing the good life.  “Evaluating the wellbeing of a person may include assessing their wellbeing achievement and their wellbeing freedom, which concerns their actual freedom to live well and be well; their freedom to enjoy various possible states of wellbeing associated with different ways of functionings [21.Jeferey Spring, 2011, 4].”  The evaluative necessity of freedom in the determination of development rests in the presupposition that freedom is not just the primary end of development but it is likewise its principal means [22.Amartya Sen, 10].

4. Democracy and Political Violence	

	By placing special emphasis on the necessity of individual freedom, seen as the evaluative measure for the determination of development, Sen’s capability approach presupposes that human beings are the primary ends of development.  Sen explicates that: “Development is to be assessed in terms of whether the freedoms that individuals have are enhanced and development is to be achieved through the free agency of individuals [23.Ibid., 4].” The capability approach, though insisting on the necessity of individual freedom being a vital aspect for human flourishing, does not disqualify the vital role that any society or institutional arrangements play in the realization of human development. Despite of Sen’s emphatic insistence on the vitality of individual freedom –being both the end and the means of development– the capability approach does not isolate the individual from the social milieu he belongs. That is, “Sen’s capability approach does not separate the thoughts, choices and the actions of individual human beings from the society in which they live, since individuals are quintessentially social creatures [24.Severine Deneulin, 106].” What this means is the freedom and agency that everyone enjoys are determined by the social structures that an individual subject is part of. His modes of choosing and acting are always determined by the collective consciousness that is prevalent to the social milieu he finds himself in. That is the individual subject may have freedom to act in accordance to what he thinks good and reasonable for him, but his “choices are heavily influenced by norms and institutions (market as well as social) [25.Frances Stewart, 6].” This is so because: “Individual freedoms are inescapably linked to the existence of social arrangements, and our opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist and how they function [26.Amartya Sen, 142].”
	Development for Sen is quintessentially a social enterprise. That is, although the capability approach centers its notion of development on the substantive freedom of the individual subjects –being the lone criterion for measuring development– but its fulfillment rests in the kind of social institution that will help realize its goals. And the type of government that is fit to serve this purpose of realizing the goals of human development is, for Sen, a democratic social arrangement. Democracy is the best if not the only institution that truly allows the development of the individual subject’s substantive freedom. In a functioning democracy everyone is recognized as having political and civil rights which serve as the fulcrum for development. Sen explicates the importance of political and civil rights in the pursuit of development by insisting on the instrumental role that these entitlements are directed to. He asserts that:

In that context, we have to look at the connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the prevention of major economic disasters, on the other. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to demand appropriate public action. The response of a government to the acute suffering of its people often depends on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political rights (such as voting, criticizing, protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the political incentives that operate on a government [27.Amartya Sen, 1999, 6]. 

Democratic freedom, which is basically expressed with the individual subject’s exercise of his political rights, is quintessentially vital for the development of the person. Democratic freedom basically allows the individual to insist for his right to development. That is, it allows the individual person to insist for his right over some political incentives (such as: to live a life that is good, to be healthy, to be educated, to be allowed to partake into political engagements, to appear in public without being shamed, and the like) that are proper to him being part of a democratic institution. So that in essence, political rights do serve a positive role in the development of the person in general. The proliferation of the individual political rights is possible only if one is part of a democratic political arrangement. This is so because for Sen, it is only in a democracy that everyone’s rights and freedom are protected. The reason for this is democracy values “first, the intrinsic importance of political participation and freedom in human life; second, the instrumental importance of political incentives in keeping governments responsible and accountable; and third, the constructive role of democracy in the formation of values and in the understanding of needs, rights, and duties [28.Ibid., 8].” Democracy, in this regard, is directed upon realizing individual freedom by allowing the individual subject to exercise his freedom to insist for development to actively take part in any institutional arrangements that he deems relevant to him being free and rational. In a real democracy, everyone is capacitated to freely choose the life they find reasonable to live.  More so, in a real democracy war and conflict do not exist. This is so because as Sen explicates:

The practice of democracy gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form its values and priorities. Even the idea of “needs” including the understanding of “economic needs,” requires public discussion and exchange on information, views, and analyses. In this sense, democracy has a constructive importance, in addition to its intrinsic value for the lives of the citizens and its instrumental importance in political decisions [29.Ibid.].

	In a war infested area, the protective role of democracy diminishes to its minimum of simply becoming a night watcher. The instrumental value of democracy rests in its keeping and recognizing each and everyone’s political rights to development. It enriches the individual by recognizing the intrinsic value of his political freedom, which is for Sen, part of his freedom in general. Moreover, it further allows the individual to insist on expressing his needs and is guaranteed of all political attention. Lastly is allows the opportunity for a social and political discourse on matters that the individual deems necessary and relevant for his wellbeing [30.Ibid.]. All these functions of democracy are intended towards the development of the individual members of the state. And it is the moral obligation of a democratic government to sustain and keep such instrumental role. But what transpires the moment a state is engaged in war, as discussed in the first section of this paper, is the contrary.  The protective role of democracy loses its instrumental value in the time of war. For instead of allowing the individual to flourish by recognizing his intrinsic value, it rather reduces the individual subjects (innocent civilians) in the war zone as sheer objects of war, that is as casualties of war. The protection of the civil and political rights of civilians in war is no longer the priority of the government. The civilians are reduced to sheer expendables of casualties of war.
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